Abstract
Introduction
Spam e-mails have become a serious technological and economic problem. So far we have been reasonably able to resist spam e-mails, although statistics show a proportion of spam higher than 60% [11, 12] . The availability of the Internet e-mail system for regular e-mail communication is currently ensured by complementary anti-spam approaches, mainly by blocking and filtering procedures. However, if we are to avert the danger of losing the Internet e-mail service as a valuable, free, and worldwide medium of open communication, anti-spam activities should be performed more systematically than is done in current, mainly heuristic, anti-spam approaches. A formal framework within which the modes of spam delivery, anti-spam approaches, and their effectiveness can be investigated, may encourage a shift in methodology and pave the way for new, holistic anti-spam approaches. In Section 2 the Internet e-mail infrastructure is modeled as a directed graph and a deterministic finite automaton and the appropriateness of the model is proved. In section 3 all possible modes of sending (spam) e-mails are derived and presented as regular expressions. These (technically-oriented) expressions are then grouped into categories according to types of organization participating in e-mail delivery. The effectiveness of today's most important anti-spam approaches is assessed in section 4 by matching them with the modes of spamming. Section 5 summarizes the results presented in this manuscript and outlines future work.
Model of the Internet e-mail infrastructure
The Internet e-mail infrastructure can be modeled as a directed graph G which is defined in the first subsection. In the second subsection it is shown that all types of e-mail deliveries can be described with a set of (directed) paths in G. As each option to send emails at the same time represents an option to send spam e-mails the set of spamming options and the set of mailing options are regarded to be equal.
Definition
Since the Internet e-mail network infrastructure which the graph is intended to represent is dynamic, it is not meaningful to model each concrete e-mail node. The different types of Internet e-mail nodes on the other hand are static, and it is these which can serve the purpose. An e-mail node is here defined as a software unit which is involved in the Internet e-mail delivery process and works on the TCP/IP application layer. Consideration of software working exclusively on lower levels such as routers and bridges is beyond the scope of this work, as are options to send an email without any SMTP communication with an email node of the recipient's organization. However, this does not seem to be an important restriction, as almost all e-mail users receive their e-mails from a server that is (directly or indirectly) SMTP connected to the Internet.
Let G={V,E,c} be a directed graph with vertex set V and edge set E, and let c: E L be a total function on E where L denotes a set of (protocol) labels. First the structure of the graph is presented graphically (see figure 1 ) and formally. Its semantics is then explained in more detail.
The set of vertices can be depicted as the disjoint union of five vertex sets V 1 ,…,V 5 . Each of these sets is attached to one of the organizational units participating in e-mail delivery: sender, sending organization or e-mail (service) provider, Internet, receiving organization, and recipient. In cases where the recipient does not use a receiving organization as e-mail service provider (ESP) but runs his own e-mail receiving and processing environment the organizational units receiving organization and recipient merge. This, however, does not affect the structure of the graph, which retains its general validity. The set of vertices be V=V 1 E and c are not defined formally here, but shown graphically in figure 1 .
Each vertex corresponds to a type of e-mail node. An edge e=(v 1 ,v 2 ) with a label c(e) ∈ L attached exists if and only if the Internet e-mail infrastructure allows e-mail flow between the corresponding node types; c(e) denotes the set of feasible protocols. SMTP is the union of three sets of protocols. The first contains all Internet application protocols excepting SMTP*, the second, all proprietary application protocols used on the Internet: this inclusion takes tunneling procedures into account. The third set, since use of application protocols is not mandatory for the exchange of data in a network, are all Internet protocols on the transport and network layer of the Department of Defense (DoD) model, such as TCP and IP. MAP is the set of all e-mail access protocols used to transfer e-mails from the recipient's e-mail server to his MUA. Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP) version 4 (RFC 1730) and POP version 3 (RFC 1939) are here among the protocols most deployed. The set HTTP(S) contains the protocols HTTP (RFC 2616) as well as its secure versions "HTTP over SSL" [3] and "HTTP over TLS" (RFC2818). Finally, the set INT denotes protocols and procedures for internal e-mail delivery, i. e. inside the receiving organization, such as getting e-mails from an internal MTA and storing them into the users' e-mail boxes. 
Appropriateness
The meaning of G in the context of e-mail delivery is given by the fact that the different types of e-mail delivery can be described by a set of specific (directed) paths in G. Before this issue is formally addressed in proposition 1, it will be shown that each type of e-mail node corresponds to a vertex in G:
Lemma 1 Let T be the set of types of e-mail nodes involved in e-mail delivery. Then there is a bijection between T and V.
The proof of lemma 1 is given in the Appendix. It should be noted that the e-mail nodes are logical nodes representing software, some of which may fall in one physical node in a particular instance of e-mail delivery (e.g. 
MDA
).
Given Lemma 1, we can now proof the following
, be a sequence of types of e-mail nodes involved in a complete 1 e-mail delivery and S the set of all feasible sequences, i.e. all types of e-mail delivery. Let p be a (directed) path in G between two vertices 1 By "complete" I mean that the e-mail has reached the recipient's e-mail box on his e-mail server or the MTA of the receiving organization which applies a forwarding rule or rejects the message. That is, forwarding an e-mail and sending a bounce email starts a new sequence. Furthermore, only those e-mail deliveries are regarded which are either initiated by a sender's client or, in case of bouncing or forwarding e-mails, by an ESP's MTA.
and P the set of all these paths. Then there is a bijection f between S and P.
The proof of proposition 1 is given in the Appendix. Proposition 1 provides the basis for formally representing modes of sending an (spam) email. System security violations, caused by, e.g., viruses, Trojan horses, or worms, which may affect email nodes belonging to a sending or receiving organization are not considered here. Possible violations in users' systems, which are more relevant anyway, are, however, included.
Each of the possibilities of sending one e-mail also permits the sending of a number of e-mails, as is the case with the millions of e-mails spammers send. So, to identify all the possibilities of sending spam e-mails we must consider the set of possibilities of sending one e-mail. Since these are represented by the set of all paths in G from V start to V end , we are now provided with a formal approach to the modes of spamming available.
Model and classification of spamming options
The graph G will serve as a basis for deriving all modes of spamming. It provides a formal framework within which the effectiveness of (present and future)
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technological anti-spam measures can be theoretically analyzed. It also shows all possible spam delivery routes which any holistic anti-spam measures would need to cover.
The modes of spamming are formally presented in the first subsection. A classification of them follows in the second subsection.
Modes of spamming
For the sake of simplification, we consider all paths from V start to MailServ recOrg , denoted as P'. For simplification, all paths from V start to MailServ recOrg are regarded, denoted with P'. Now that P' is identified, we obtain, by simply extensions, all the paths from V start to V end , i.e. P. P' is arrived at applying some basic ideas from automata theory: the graph G is transformed into a Deterministic Finite Automaton (DFA) A=(S,Σ,δ,Start,F) where S is a finite set of states, Σ is an alphabet, Start is the initial state, F ⊆ S is the set of final states, and δ is a function from S x Σ to S. This automaton recognizes a language that (bijectively) corresponds to P', such that w=(w 1,…, w n )∈L(A) ⇔ (w 1 ,…,w n )∈P, where L(A) is the language recognized by A. The construction is selfevident and can be described informally as follows. The set of states S corresponds to the nodes of G extended by an artificial state Start which serves as the initial state, corresponds to the nodes of G, as well. An edge (v 1 ,v 2 ) means that the transition function δ includes δ(s 1 ,s 2 )=s 2 , i.e. state s 2 is reached if and only if the symbol s 2 is "read" by A. In order to account for the starting node, δ also needs to include δ(Start,s 2 )=s 2 with s 2 being a state corresponding to any node of the set of starting nodes V start . F only contains the state corresponding to the node inc recOrg MTA .
The language recognized by the DFA A -and thus P' -can be described with a regular expression because of the equivalence between DFAs and regular expressions. For simplicity, the states are labeled with capital letters which are assigned to the corresponding nodes (see figure 1) ; elements of are set in lower case letters. Given two regular expressions r 1 and r 2 , ~ denotes the relationship between r 1 and r 2 with r 1~r2 : ⇔ L(r 1 )=L(r 2 ); Λ be the regular expression with L(Λ)=ε. Using the edges of G we get L(A)=L(Start) with
Let α, β, γ be regular expressions, then recursive relationships can be dissolved using the rule α ~ βα ∨ γ, ε ∉ L(β) (13) α ~ β*γ (1) can be solved by application of simple substitutions and multiple application of rule (13) , yielding:
As (14) shows, the infrastructural modes of sending a(n) (spam) e-mail are numerous and should therefore be grouped appropriately.
Spamming categories
Grouping can be done by subsuming those options in which the same types of organizational units participate. As the receiving organization participates in each complete e-mail delivery process and the recipient does not affect the delivery process these two units are not integrated into the classification. Accordingly, the set of spamming categories results from the integration of a local sender, an ESP and the Internet (application level infrastructure) which provides eights options. The options (groups, categories) are defined and explained in table 1. The cases in which neither a local sender nor an ESP is involved are only theoretical ones. The model requires a sender or sending organization to appear before any Internet e-mail node: an e-mail either starts from a In all other scenarios the spammer uses a local client which seems much more likely and easier for the spammer. Scenario III describes those cases in which a spammer does not use an ESP but, of course, an Internet service provider (ISP) operating not higher than on transport layer, i.e. simple forwarding Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packets. As in this scenario the spammer connects directly with an MTA of the receiving organization he is restricted to the e-mail ports implemented there. Usually, port 25 or 587 is used. This makes it easy for ISPs to prevent most spam e-mails sent that way by simply blocking TCP packets to these ports. Scenario 4 is much harder to address as spammers use Internet nodes including gateways and thus are not restricted to ports 25 and 587. In Scenario V the spammer uses an ESP to send spam e-mails thereby abusing the e-mail service. Even if the number of e-mails per day and account is restricted it remains challenging to prevent the spammer from setting up new accounts automatically. Scenario VI seems quite unlikely. It refers to a spammer who uses an ESP who forwards e-mails by sending them to intermediate nodes in the Internet. This might occur if the ESP supports spamming activities of customers. Grouping the spamming options of (14) according to the six categories shown in table 1 yields after some transformations:
Effectiveness of anti-spam approaches
The effectiveness of the most discussed and deployed anti-spam approaches is assessed on a theoretical and qualitative level, any quantitative and empirical results are out of scope of this manuscript. Table 2 shows which spamming options can be effectively addressed by which anti-spam approach. An "x" indicates an effective coverage, a blank entry means that no effective coverage is possible. Some anti-spam approaches have general impacts on spam, i.e. their effectiveness do not depend on the way the spam was sent. Filter, blocking mechanisms basing on gray lists, and address obscuring techniques belong to these approaches and are thus not included in table 2. Filter (programs) heuristically classify incoming e-mails into ham and spam e-mails. They prescind from the spamming option and solely focus on the e-mail document which has already received by the organization's incoming mail server inc recOrg MTA or even by the user's mail client rec MUA . Spam filters can be categorized according to the type of filtering method (e.g. statistical filters [4] or neural networkbased filters -version 3 of the open-source spam filter software SpamAssassin uses a neural network) and according to the e-mail parts inspected by the filter: the header and/or the body can be filtered. All filters suffer from the same drawbacks:
As they are heuristic approaches they might classify incorrectly: spam e-mails might pass the filter ("false-negatives"), ham e-mails might be filtered and probably even deleted ("false-positives"). Spammers are forced to send even more emails to compensate filters' success. The goal of filters is not to prevent spam but to detect it. But when spam e-mails are detected on recipient's site resources (e.g. band width, storage capacity, CPU time reserved for filter software) already have been consumed. Spammers continue upgrading their skills and it is doubtful if filters can be created which are effective in the long-term. Gray lists [6] are used for temporarily blocking incoming e-mails: They take advantage of the fact that spamming e-mail MTAs often don't implement the standardized "resume feature" according to which a once rejected e-mail is sent again after some minutes. If the same e-mail arrives a second time in a specific time window it may pass. For example, the RWTH Aachen University has implemented a gray list system that stores the IP of the sending host, the sender address, and the recipient address. However, once spammer can access a pool of valid e-mail addresses which might have been stolen, bought, or harvested, they certainly will implement the resume feature thus bypassing the gray list approach.
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Resource-based approaches to prevent spam have been proposed in [1] and [2] : before an e-mail can be sent a function has to be calculated which is time-or memory-consuming, respectively. These approaches faces at least two problems: (1) How can solicited bulk e-mail been sent? (2) How can spammers be stopped from allocating sufficient resources?
Address obscuring techniques (AOTs) generally aim at either hiding e-mail addresses or restricting them to a limited use. An example of the former type is the proposal of Hall [5] according to which a user can have an arbitrary number of unguessable addresses (channels). An approach of the latter group is Ioannidis' proposal of a single-purpose address (SPA) which encapsulates a policy in the e-mail address [8] . This policy defines the acceptable use of the address, e.g. the sender allowed to direct an eemail to this address. SPAs are cryptographically protected to shield them from tampering. AOTs only refer to machine-to-person e-mail communication as the addresses are difficult to handle for humans. A second restriction of AOTs' usefulness refers to the complicated first-time person-to-person contacting as a recipient cannot anticipate all regular e-mail connections.
Blocking e-mails is a broadly used mechanism where an e-mail passes or is rejected due to the IP address of the sending node. IP addresses of nodes known to send spam e-mails are listed on local and/or public black lists. and other types of Trojan-horse exploits. Black lists are not effective in first-time spamming, where nodes send spam e-mails for the first time. As spammers tend to change their IP addresses frequently by switching to another ISP or misusing exploits on unsuspicious 3rd party nodes black lists can only stop corrupt ESPs, as they usually do not change their IPs frequently. Blocking whole IP ranges -e.g. belonging to ISPs or even countries known to host spammerscan address "repeated spamming" but easily leads to a digital divide.
A straightforward option easy to implement is to restrict the number of e-mails which can be sent from a user's account. This approach is only applicable when an ESP is involved, but even then the automatic set-up of an arbitrary number of new e-mail account is possible. Some ESPs apply CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) procedures which provide a numbers or a word which has to be retyped. However, current implementations are not effective as they are insecure, e.g. [10] presents a procedure which is able to detect the content of 92% of all pictures created by the Yahoo CAPTCHA process. Another attack on visual CAPTCHA processes proceeds as follows: the spammer puts the ESP's picture on his own web site and asks users to read the text and enter it in a text field manually to gain access to adult information. The spammer puts the text field's content in the corresponding text field of the ESP's form. All this can be done automatically.
Blocking all (uncontrolled) TCP traffic on port 25 is an option for ISP which is easy to implement and prevents spammers' and exploited computers to send spam e-mails when port 25 is used. Activities of agents using other ports and connecting with gateways are not covered. It must be noted, that this approach means to exclude the operation of an MTA running on a user's or company's computer.
Environments enabling the recipient to authenticate the sender or at least the sending organization have been proposed. Public Key Cryptography provides the mathematical and algorithmic instruments for digital signing documents, Public Key Infrastructures (PKIs) feature the organizational framework. As most e-mail user's do not have a personal key pair, current implementations aim at authenticating at least organizations and (second level) domains. The procedure is straightforward: the sending organization signs an e-mail with its private key, once the sending organization's domain can be verified by applying the public key, it can be compared to the domain used by the sender in the From: field of the message to detect forgeries. An example is Yahoo's "DomainKeys" [14] which is the currently most discussed one. An PKIbased approach presumes that the sending organization is not corrupt and that its MTAs do not suffer from any exploit. A problem with this approach arises when spammers get a key pair for a domain which is used by them temporarily just for spamming purpose. PKI-based approaches are helpful when exploits of unsuspicious computers, e.g. spamming machines residing on the user's computer and being remotely controllable due to a Trojan horse, try to send spam e-mails bypassing the MTAs and the signing software of the sender's organization. Then, no authentication on recipient's side is possible or successful. Quite a serious challenge appears when spamming software on infected computers reads misuses the user's account information for outgoing emails including a password. The sending organization can not differ between user's regular e-mails and emails sent by a local spamming machine.
Another authentication-based approach is the use of an Lightweight MTA Authentication Protocol (LMAP) [9] . The LMAP family subsumes a set of DNS-based approaches where it is checked whether a message that claims to be from buffy@sunnydale.com was actually sent from an MTA of the sunnydale.com organization. If not, the e-mail is a forgery or an intermediate MTA was used as external e-mail relay. Reverse MX (RMX) Designated Mailers Protocol (DMP), Sender Policy Framework (SPF), and SenderID belong to most discussed approaches, however, no standardization was made and the IETF working group MARID was dissolved in 2004. LMAP approaches effectively address the unauthorized use of relays and gateways but feature similar weaknesses as the PKI-based ones.
ICANN has presented an organizational and technological framework proposed by Spamhaus [7] in which a new sponsored top level domain (sTLD), e.g., .mail, is used. The proposed sTLD will be limited for use by the registrant only during the process of sending e-mail. A registrant must have already registered for a domain key, e.g. icann.org, to get the domain key.sTLD, e.g. icann.org.mail. More demands to be met by a registrant were proposed, e.g. validated whois information must be available, the key domain must have been already registered for at least 6 months, and an appropriate technological anti-spam protection has to be implemented. The registrant must inform the central (sponsoring) organization (SO) of the IPs and hostnames of the sending mail server. Then, the SO enters A records in the DNS for the new domain which enables recipient MTAs to use an LMAP or a PKI-based authentication. Abuse messages for key.sTLD are received by a central Proceedings of the 39th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences -2006 organization (sponsoring organization) providing a control mechanism. Although the framework promises to be effective against many spamming procedures one problem remains: How can an appropriate technological anti-spam protection be achieved? The framework does not cover the case when zombie PCs -often exploited by spammers with Trojan horsessend spam e-mails.
Summing up the effectiveness of anti-spam approaches which is illustrated in table 2 it must be stressed that no anti-spam approach is currently capable of effectively stopping spammers activities which aim at exploiting the ESPs' infrastructure (scenario V). Main problems are still the spammers' option to set-up and then misuse e-mail accounts automatically and spammers activities regarding the exploits of unsuspicious computers. The latter trouble becomes worse as spammers use "botnets" which are networks of compromised machines that can be remotely controlled by an attacker [13] .
Summary and outlook
The modes of spam delivery can be described formally with 12 regular expressions. Comparison of what are currently the most important anti-spam approaches with the modes of spamming show that exploitation of PCs and ESP infrastructures are not effectively dealt with. Moreover, most activities focus on the detection rather than the prevention of spam. But this may in fact be counterproductive because spammers are encouraged to send even more e-mails in order to compensate for losses from detection.
Anti-spam activities should be performed more systematically than is done in current, mainly heuristic, anti-spam approaches. Models and formal procedures are possibly an adequate way to assess the effectiveness of anti-spam approaches and to develop new, holistic approaches which would focus on the prevention of spam e-mails.
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Appendix
Proof of lemma 1 Technical e-mail nodes can be assigned to the organizational unit that acts as sender of an e-mail, the sender's organization (sender's ESP), the recipient, the recipient's organization (recipient ' GW , use SMTP neither for incoming nor for outgoing messages where A and B can be the same protocol (when A=B we usually talk about a proxy, but for simplicity we subsume this under gateway). No other (important) types of e-mail node are involved in Internet e-mail deliveries. Different types are mapped onto different vertices (injection), and no vertices other than those mentioned exist (surjection), i.e. there is a bijection between T and V.
Proof of proposition 1 The proof is in three steps. (1) A function f:S→P is defined, (2) injection of f is shown, (3) surjection of f is shown.
(1) Defining f is straightforward: Given a sequence of e-mail nodes is the corresponding vertex to s i for all i=1,…,k; s(i) exists due to the bijection of lemma 1. It still has to be shown that the image of f is a subset of P, i.e. that f(s) is a (directed) path in G between V start and V end for all s∈S. This is true if and only if for all s∈S, k=|s| holds: (p i ,p i+1 )∈E for all i=1,…,(k-1), i.e. G contains directed edges between all vertices which correspond to two email nodes appearing consecutively in any sequence s∈S. It is easy to see that the latter condition is fulfilled. To prove that the first condition is fulfilled it is sufficient to show that the design criteria for edges in G (see above) are met: an edge e=(v 1 ,v 2 ) exists if and only if the Internet e-mail infrastructure allows email flow between the corresponding node types. 
